Lecture 12 - Evolutionary Stability: Social Convention, Aggression, and Cycles

We apply the idea of evolutionary stability to consider the evolution of social conventions. Then we consider games that involve aggressive (Hawk) and passive (Dove) strategies, finding that sometimes, evolutionary populations are mixed. We discuss how such games can help us to predict how behavior might vary across settings. Finally, we consider a game in which there is no evolutionary stable population and discuss an example from nature.

Om Podcasten

About the Course This course is an introduction to game theory and strategic thinking. Ideas such as dominance, backward induction, Nash equilibrium, evolutionary stability, commitment, credibility, asymmetric information, adverse selection, and signaling are discussed and applied to games played in class and to examples drawn from economics, politics, the movies, and elsewhere. Course Structure This Yale College course, taught on campus twice per week for 75 minutes, was recorded for Open Yale Courses in Fall 2007. https://oyc.yale.edu/economics/econ-159